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Severing the Legislative Veto Provision: The
Aftermath of Chada
INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that congressional
veto provisions violate the Constitution because they fail to meet
the requirements of presentment and bicameralism set forth in Arti-
cle 1, Section 7 of the United States Constitution.1 That decision
swept aside a fifty year old device found in more than two hundred
statutes. 2 In one fell swoop, the Supreme Court's decision struck
down provisions in more laws enacted by Congress than the Court
had cumulatively invalidated in its history.3 Unless Congress acts
to amend these statutes, courts will be asked to determine whether a
congressional veto provision is severable from its framework. 4
A congressional veto provision, hereinafter referred to as a veto
provision, is a mechanism employed by Congress to control the ex-
ercise of certain authority it delegates to the executive branch.5 The
veto provision has allowed Congress to delegate extensive and
sweeping powers to the executive, thus facilitating the administra-
tion of complex and pervasive laws. 6 One example of veto provision
can be found in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Con-
trol Act of 1974.7 This Act provides that any proposed deferral of
budget authority, which was provided for a specific project or pur-
pose, may be disapproved or vetoed by an impoundment resolution
1. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). In
Chada, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the congressional veto. For
a discussion of the congressional veto, see Schwartz, Legislative Veto and the Constitu-
tion-A Reexamination, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978).
2. Smith & Struve, Aftershock of the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69 A.B.A.J. 1258
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
3. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (White, J., dissenting).
4. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1261.
5. Id.
6. Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 462, 462 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Javits].
7. 31 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976). The following is the test of the veto provision in the
Budget Impoundment Control Act:
Disapproval of proposed deferrals of budget authority
(a) Transmittal of special message.
Whenever the President, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, the head of any department of agency of the United States or any
officer or employee of the United States proposes to defer any budget author-
ity provided for a specific purpose or project, the President shall transmit to
the House of Representatives and the Senate a special message specifying-
(1) the amount of the budget authority proposed to be deferred;
(2) any account, department, or establishment of the Government to
1
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of either house. 8
The issue whether a veto provision is severable is extremely im-
portant because it will determine whether the remainder of the stat-
ute is valid after it is excised.9 If a veto provision is severable, the
remainder of the statute may remain intact as law. 10 If, however, it
is not severable, the remainder of the statute would also be declared
unconstitutional.1" As a result, the tests used to determine sever-
ability will affect the validity of over two hundred statutes.12
Because the issue of severability of veto provisions is so impor-
tant, and its effects will be so wide-spread, the tests applied to deter-
mine whether a veto provision is severable should be closely
scrutinized. As veto provisions are challenged by private parties
and governmental agencies, the courts will have to determine
whether those provisions can be severed, and if their statutory
framework is constitutional without the veto provision. This Com-
ment is divided into three sections. First, it will provide a back-
ground and history of the veto provision. Second, it will assert that
which such budget authority is available for obligation, and the specific
projects or governmental functions involved;
(3) the period of time during which the budget authority is proposed to be
deferred;
(4) the reasons for the proposed deferral, including any legal authority
invoked by him to justify the proposed deferral;
(5) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated fiscal, economic,
and budgetary effect of the proposed deferral; and
(6) all facts, circumstances, and considerations relating to or bearing upon
the proposed deferral and the decision to effect the proposed deferral, includ-
ing an analysis of such facts, circumstances, and considerations in terms of
their application to any legal authority and specific elements of legal authority
invoked by him to justify such proposed deferral, and to the maximum extent
practicable, the estimated effect of the proposed deferral upon the objects, pur-
poses, and programs for which the budget authority is provided.
A special message may include one or more proposed deferrals of budget
authority. A deferral may not be proposed for any period of time extending
beyond the end of the fiscal year in which the special message proposing the
deferral is transmitted to the House and the Senate.
(b) Requirement to make available for obligation.
Any amount of budget authority proposed to be deferred, as set forth in a
special message transmitted under section (a) of this section, shall be made
available for obligation if either House of Congress passes an impoundment
resolution disapproving such proposed deferral.
(c) Exception
The provisions of this section do not apply to any budget authority pro-
posed to be rescinded or that is to be reserved as set forth in a special message
required to be transmitted under Section 1402 of this title.
8. Id.
9. See generally Smith, supra note 2. If an unconstitutional provision of a statute
cannot be severed the entire statute must fail.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
2
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the test recently applied by three courts' 3 to determine the sever-
ability of veto provisions is inadequate to make a proper determina-
tion of the issue. Third, this Comment will propose an alternative
test which is better suited to adequately determine whether a veto
provision should be severed. It should be noted that this Comment
will not address the issue of the constitutionality of veto
provisions. 14
I. BACKGROUND
In 1932, the first veto provision was used by Congress. Since that
time, 320 veto provisions have been inserted in 210 different stat-
utes.' 5 Congress has progressively increased its use of the congres-
sional veto since its first application. The following table will give
some indication of the increasing frequency with which Congress
has employed veto provisions.
Years Statutes Affected
1932- 1939 5
1940- 1949 19
1950- 1951 34
1960- 1969 49
1970- 1975 16316
In 1983, the Supreme Court declared one form of the congres-
sional veto unconstitutional in INS v. Chada.17 In Chada, the
Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Ninth Circuit'8 which
held Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act
(INA)' 9 unconstitutional. In its decision, the Supreme Court em-
13. The three courts used as examples in this Comment (1) Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983); (2) American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (1982); and
(3) 30 Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d
425 (1982) were chosen for two reasons: (1) They represent the current test which is
being applied by the courts to determine severability, and (2) because they provide a
clear indication of why the test they used to determine severability are inadequate.
14. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). The issue of the constitutionality of veto provi-
sions has already been decided.
15. See generally Smith, supra note 2.
16. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2781. This table provides an indication of how Congress
has increasingly relied on the legislative veto. It has become one of the most important
legislative tools used by Congress to control the implementation of statutes.
17. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764.
18. Chada v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (1980). The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Act, unconstitutional and severable from the rest of the statute. See infra note 19
for an explanation of the I.N.A.
19. Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2) (1979). The Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act established rules and regulations to regulate immigra-
tion. The statute gave the Attorney General the authority to suspend the deportation of
an alien. However, § 244(c)(2) provided that the decision of the Attorney General
could be vetoed by a resolution of one house of Congress:
(c) Fulfillment of requirements of subsection (a); report to Congress.
3
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phasized that the "congressional veto" constituted legislative ac-
tion.20 The Court stated that the veto provision in Section 244(c)(2)
of the INA was a mechanism used by Congress to compel an official
of the executive branch to act.21 The Court further argued that the
only way Congress could compel such action is to pass legislation.22
Since the veto provision performed the function of legislation it had
to meet the requirements of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitu-
tion,23 which requires that "every bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it becomes
law be presented to the President of the United States .. ,,24
Thus, Court ruled that the veto provision in the INA was unconsti-
tutional. It is important to note that the Court also declared that
since the veto provision did not comply with the requirements of
(1) Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to
meet the requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney General
may in his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deportation of
any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection, a complete and
detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall
be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. Such re-
ports shall be submitted on the first day of each calendar month in which
Congress is in session.
(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this
section-
if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the
close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case
is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolu-
tion stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deporta-
tion, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the
alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation
in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the
Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the At-
torney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.
(3) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this
section-
if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the
close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case
is reported, the Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance
that it favors the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall
cancel deportation proceedings. If within the time above specified the Con-
gress does not pass such a concurrent resolution, or if either the House Senate
or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it
does not favor the suspension of the deportation of such alien, the Attorney
General shall thereupon deport such alien in the manner provided by law.
20. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764 at 2785. The Court stated that a veto provision consti-
tuted legislative action since it served to compel an executive officer to act in a certain
way. Since this could only be done by legislation the veto provision assured the function
of legislation.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. This section is popularly known as the present-
ment clause. It requires that all legislation passed by Congress be presented to the
President for his approval or veto. In order for a statute to take effect it must comply
with the requirement of Article I, Section 7.
4
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Article I, Section 7, the provision was unconstitutional because it
violated the requirements of bicameralism and separation of'
powers.25
The invalidation of the veto provision in Chada26 will probably
reach similar veto provisions in other statutes, since by their nature
all veto provisions would have to meet the requirements of Article
I, Section 7.27 Since the veto provisions have "the purpose and ef-
fect of altering the legal rights and duties of persons" by compelling
or restricting action, they constitute legislation and as such must
meet the requirements of Article I, Section 7.28
In Consumer Energy Council ofAmerica v. Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission, (CECA)29 the constitutionality of the veto pro-
vision in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 197830 was challenged. The
court of appeals held that the provision did not require the concur-
rence of the Senate or the approval of the President.31
In American Federation of Government Employees v. Pierce,
(AFGE)32 the same court which decided CECA 33 ruled that a veto
provision in the Housing and Urban Development Appropriation
Act 34 was unconstitutional. 35 The court cited their opinion in
CECA 36 and stated the veto provision failed to meet the present-
ment requirements of Article I, Section 7,37 and was
unconstitutional. 38
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Chada and the
court of appeals decisions in CECA 39 and AFGE,4° executive agen-
cies and private parties will challenge other statutes containing veto
provisions when the exercise of a veto provision adversely affects
their interests. The federal courts may be called upon to rule on the
25. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764 at 2786-87.
26. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764.
27. Id. at 2784-85; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 1260. It can be asserted that the
decision in Chada could be applied to other forms of congressional vetos. None of the
congressional vetos used requires that the veto action taken by Congress be presented to
the President. As a result, they will probably be ruled unconstitutional.
28. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2764; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 1260.
29. 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1976). The NGPA directs the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission to implement pricing programs relating to natural gas.
31. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673
F.2d 425, 448 (1982).
32. 697 F.2d 303 (1982).
33. 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
34. Housing and Urban Development Act, 96 Stat. 1160 (1983).
35. AFGE, 697 F.2d 303, 306 (1982).
36. 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
37. AFGE, 697 F.2d at 306.
38. Id.
39. 373 F.2d 425 (1982).
40. 697 F.2d 303 (1982).
[Vol. 21
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constitutionality of a wide variety of statutes41 which contain veto
provisions, including the War Powers Act 42 and the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. 43
Once a veto provision is found to be unconstitutional, the issue of
severability must be addressed to determine whether the remainder
of the statute is valid without it.44 The tests applied by a court to
make this decision are of paramount importance since they will de-
termine the approach of the court and the outcome of its decision.
This Comment will now turn to examine the origin of the test
applied by the three courts45 mentioned above, in determining
whether a veto provision could be severed. It will then examine the
tests applied by the three courts to determine the severability of
their respective veto provisions.
II. ORIGINS OF TESTS TO DETERMINE THE SEVERABILITY OF A
STATUTORY PROVISION
The tests46 adopted by the courts in Chada,47 AFGE,48 and
CECA 49 to determine the severability of veto provisions were de-
rived from a line of cases which created rules for determining the
severability of a statutory provision.50 These rules applied to the
severability of unconstitutional provisions in general.51
In Champline Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission,52 the
Supreme Court established the rule that an unconstitutional provi-
sion of a statute could be severed unless: (1) it was evident that the
legislature would not have enacted the constitutional provisions in-
dependently from the unconstitutional provisions, and (2) the re-
maining portions of the statute, after the excise of the
unconstitutional provision, would be fully operative as law.53 In
41. See 103 S. Ct. 2764 for a list.
42. 50 U.S.C. § 2367 (1976). Commonly known as the War Powers Act, this stat-
ute allows Congress to control the President's actions regarding the use of United States
troops in foreign military operations absent a declaration of war.
43. 31 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976).
44. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
45. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce,
697 F.2d 303 (1982); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
46. See infra notes 69-108 and accompanying text.
47. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764.
48. 697 F.2d 303 (1982).
49. 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
50. See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
51. The rules discussed here refer to the tests applied by courts to sever unconstitu-
tional provisions of statutes. Veto provisions were not considered unconstitutional until
Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764.
52. 286 U.S. 210 (1932). In Champline, the court was concerned with severing a
provision of a statute which they found unconstitutional.
53. Id. at 233-35.
1984]
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Carter v. Carter Coal,54 the Supreme Court refined the test applied
in Champline.55 The Court stated that legislative intent should be
the governing factor used to determine severability.5 6 The Court
defined the test by stating that the statutory construction and legis-
lative intent should be used to determine whether an unconstitu-
tional provision of a statute must fall.5 7 The tests for severability
were further developed in Electric Bond and Share Co. v. S.E. C.5 8
In Electric Bond, the Court stated that the test applied to determine
if an unconstitutional provision of a statute should be severed must
perform two functions. First, it should examine whether the uncon-
stitutional provision and the remainder of the Act are so interwoven
with each other that their separation would be inherently difficult.5 9
Second, the test should look to the statute to see if it contains a
severability clause.6
According to Electric Bond, there is a presumption against sever-
ability of statute, if it does not contain a severability clause.61 Thus,
the presence or absence of such a clause would be a significant fac-
tor in determining whether a provision of a statute is severable. 62
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo,63 interpreted the
rules which had previously been established regarding the severabil-
ity of unconstitutional provisions."r The Court emphasized that
legislative intent is the key test which should be used to determine if
a provision of statute may be severed. 65
All of the above-mentioned tests cite legislative intent as the key
element in determining whether a provision of a statute may be sev-
ered. This Comment will now examine how these tests were applied
to decide the issue of whether a veto provision is severable, and why
they are inadequate to make that determination. It is important to
note that until the Ninth Circuit decided Chada, no court had ever
dealt with the problem of whether a veto provision was severable.
54. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). In Carter, the court further refined the tests for severabil-
ity. They clarified the test used in Champline.
55. 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
56. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
57. Id.
58. 303 U.S. 419 (1938). In Electric Bond, the court decided on the severability of
a provision of the Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 (1982).
59. Id. at 434-35.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley reaffirmed the rules in Electric Bond, Champline,
and Carter.
64. Id. at 75.
65. Id.
[Vol. 21
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III. TESTS APPLIED BY THE THREE COURTS To DETERMINE
THE SEVERABILITY OF A CONGRESSIONAL VETO
In Chada, the Supreme Court had to decide whether Section
244(c)(2) of the INA66 was severable. Section 244(c)(2) provided
that Congress could "veto" the decision of the Attorney General
not to deport an alien. 67 After applying a multi-faceted test the
Court held that section 244(c)(2) was severable and that the remain-
der of the statute was valid.68
The first part of the test established by the Court stated that there
is a presumption in favor of severability if a statute contains a sever-
ability clause.69 Citing Buckley v. Valeo,70 the Court stated that
"invalid portions of statutes are to be severed unless it is evident
that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which
are constitutional, independently from those which are not."' 71 The
Court then cited the presence of section 406, a severability provision
in the INA72 to show that Congress clearly intended the remainder
of the act to be valid if any particular provisions were held invalid.73
The question as to what the Court would do when there was no
severability clause was not addressed.
In the second part of the test the Court looked at the legislative
history of the INA,74 in an attempt to derive the legislative intent.75
After reviewing the legislative history of the INA,76 the Court con-
cluded that any evidence present in that history tending to show
that the veto provision should not be severed was insufficient to
rebut the presumption created by the presence of section 406.77
This is indicative of the great weight the Court gave to the presence
of a severability clause.
66. 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2) (1976). Section 244(c)(2) is the veto provision of the INA.
It provides that Congress could veto a decision of the Attorney General to suspend the
deportation of an alien by passing a resolution in the House. See supra note 19 for copy
of § 244(c)(2).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2).
68. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764.
69. Id. at 2774.
70. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
71. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2774 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 406. This provision which is popularly known as a severability
clause, stated that if any section of the INA was declared unconstitutional it should be
severed. The Court used the presence of this provision to show that Congress intended
the INA to be severable.
73. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2774. The Court emphasized the importance of the pres-
ence of the severability clause.
74. 8 U.S.C. 244(c)(2).
75. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2775. The Court looked to the comments of members of
the House of Representatives and to committee hearings to gain insight into legislative
intent.
76. The Court in Chada discussed the legislative history of the INA at length.
77. 8 U.S.C. § 406.
1984]
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The final facet of the test used in Chada inquired into whether
the statute, absent the veto provision, is "fully operative as law."' 78
It is important to note that in applying this test, the Court inquired
into whether the remainder of the statute, absent the excised por-
tion 79 would be a workable administrative mechanism.80 The Court
did not look at whether the remainder of the statute was constitu-
tional 8' on its own absent the veto provision. It should be empha-
sized that the Court in Chada relied heavily on the presence of a
severability clause in making their decision. 82 They did not provide
guidance in how to deal with a statute which did not contain such a
clause.
In Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission,83 the court of appeals looked to the legislative
history and intent behind the Natural Gas Policy Act. 84 They then
applied the test found in United States v. Jackson,85 to determine if
"Congress would have enacted the remainder of a statute without
the unconstitutional provision."' 86 After recognizing the existence
of conflicting views as to what the actual legislative history and in-
tent behind the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 were, the court
ruled that Congress would have enacted the rest of the statute ab-
sent the "veto" provision,87 and as a result the provision was ruled
to be severable.
The Natural Gas Policy Act, 88 unlike the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Act89 dealt with in Chada,90 did not contain a severability
clause.9' Its presence indicates congressional intent that invalid
parts should be excised and the remainder enforced. 92 As evidenced
by the Natural Gas Policy Act,93 not all statutes contain a severabil-
78. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2775.
79. Id. at 2775-76. In looking at the question whether the remainder of the INA
was fully operative, the Court centered its argument around whether the remaining
portion of the statute could survive as an administrative mechanism. The analysis did
not examine the question of the constitutionality of the surviving portions of the statute.
80. Id. at 2775.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2775.
83. 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1976).
85. 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1967).
86. CECA, 673 F.2d 425, 442 (1982). The court applied this test to determine
legislative intent. It is the same test found in Champline.
87. Id. The Natural Gas Policy Act did not contain a severability clause.
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-42 (1976).
89. 8 U.S.C. § 224(c)(2) (1979).
90. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
91. A severability clause is a provision of a statute through which Congress creates
a presumption that the statute is not an integrated whole which must be either sustained
in its entirety or held invalid.
92. Electric Bond and Share Co. v. S.E.C., 303 U.S. 683 (1938).
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-42 (1976).
[Vol. 21
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ity clause.
The court in Consumer Energy Council ofAmerica v. Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission94 argued that absent a severability
clause there is a presumption against severability. 95 However, after
wrestling with the issue of where the presumption lies, the court
disposed of the problem by stating that a presumption for or against
severability is not a crucial element in an inquiry to determine legis-
lative intent. 96 This seems to be in contradiction with the great im-
portance placed on the severability clause in Chada.
In American Federation of Government Employees v. Pierce,97 the
same court that decided CECA 98 held that a veto provision in the
Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act99 could not
be severed from its statutory framework.' °° The court once again
looked to the legislative history and intent to determine if Congress
would have enacted the remainder of the statute without the uncon-
stitutional provision. 101 Although the court applied the same test it
used in CECA, 10 2 it arrived at a different result and declared the
veto provision of the Housing and Urban Development Appropria-
tions Act 0 3 unseverable. °4
The Act empowered the Secretary of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment to reorganize the department subject to the congressional
veto provision. 05 When the Secretary attempted to carry out a re-
duction in force Congress exercised its veto power to prevent the
action.106 After examining the legislative history and intent of the
Act the court determined that Congress would have agreed to the
reorganization provisions without the authority to veto the Secre-
tary's actions.' 0 7 The court reasoned that since Congress would not
have conferred the power to reorganize the department to the Secre-
tary without the veto provision, the veto provision was not severa-
ble from the remainder of the Act.'0 8
94. 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
95. Id. at 488.
96. Id.
97. 697 F.2d 303 (1982).
98. 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
99. Housing and Urban Development Act, 96 Stat. 1160 (1983).
100. AFGE, 697 F.2d 303, 307 (1982).
101. Id. at 307 (1982).
102. 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
103. Housing and Urban Development Act, 96 Stat. 1160 (1983).
104. AFGE, 697 F.2d 303, 307 (1982).
105. Id. This reorganization provision allowed the executive branch to restructure
the department. The court felt that Congress would not have consented to that provi-
sion without the veto provision.
106. Id. at 307.
107. Id.
108. Id.
1984]
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The tests used by these three courts to determine whether a veto
provision is severable are not adequate to make a proper determina-
tion of whether a veto provision should be severed. By using legis-
lative intent and history to determine if a veto provision is
severable, the courts fail to address three significant problems in
their analysis.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING THE GENERAL RULES OF
SEVERABILITY TO CONGRESSIONAL VETO PROVISIONS
There are three main problems with applying the general rules of
severability to congressional veto provisions. First, systematic de-
termination of legislative intent is impossible when dealing with a
veto provision.' 0 9 Second, a congressional veto provision can be
considered a proviso 110 and as such will not lend itself to the appli-
cation of the standard test.1"' Finally, absent a veto provision, a
statute may be void as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the executive. 112 These problems are further explained
below.
1) The tests used by the courts in Chada, CECA, and AFGE are
all based on the general test for severability: the "intent of the legis-
lature."113 The determination whether a provision of the statute is
severable, will depend on how the court interprets the intent of the
legislature, 14 and more specifically, "[I]f the legislature would have
enacted the remaining portion of the statute without the unconstitu-
tional provision."' 15
One of the inadequacies of this test is the difficulty of determining
legislative intent. 1 6 Always a difficult task, the determination of
legislative intent is especially hard when dealing with a veto provi-
sion because it is not a substantial part of the statute.'" 7 As a result
109. See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
110. A proviso is a clause engrafted on an enactment to restrain and modify the
enacting clause or to except from its operation something which otherwise would have
been included, see infra note 140.
111. See supra notes 69-108 and accompanying text. All three courts centered their
determination around legislative intent.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 69-108 and accompanying text.
114. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Electric Bond & Share Co. v. S.E.C., 303
U.S. 419 (1937) Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Champline Refining Co. v.
Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
115. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Electric Bond & Share Co. v. S.E.C., 303
U.S. 419 (1937) Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 242 (1936); Champline Refining
Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
116. AFGE, 697 F.2d 303 (1982). The court recognized the problems with ascer-
taining legislative intent.
117. A veto provision is not an enacting clause. It does not by itself confer author-
ity. Its function is to allow Congress to control the application of the statute.
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there is often a lack of evidence in the legislative history, pertaining
to the importance of veto provision. 118
In CECA, 119 the court was faced with two remarkably different
interpretations of legislative history and intent of the veto provision
in Section 202 of the Natural Gas Policy Act. 120 In its analysis, the
court noted that "legislative history almost always contains contra-
dictory comments about the importance of the section which may
be subject to severability."' 2'1 Since the Natural Gas Policy Act 22
did not contain a severability clause, the court was left without one
of the key tools at its disposal to determine legislative intent. 123 The
presence of a severability clause would have provided the court with
an indication that the legislature might have passed the bill without
a veto provision. 124 It is important to note that even if there was a
severability clause, it would not provide conclusive evidence of sev-
erability. 125 The court in CECA, after examining the facts, deter-
mined that the veto provision 126 was severable.12 7 The presence of
conflicting or incomplete information regarding legislative history
makes an accurate determination of legislative intent almost impos-
sible. Thus, its effectiveness as a test to determine severability of
veto provisions is diminished significantly.
In Chada, the Supreme Court also faced the problem of having to
determine legislative intent.128 Unlike the Natural Gas Policy
Act 129 in the CECA 130 case, the statute in Chada 131 did contain a
severability clause. 132 The presence of that clause played a vital role
in assisting the majority in deciding that the legislature intended to
allow any unconstitutional provision of the INA133 to be severed. 1
118. There is not a great deal of information regarding the importance of a veto
provision in the legislative history. Most of the testimony is usually concerned with the
substantive issues of the statutes.
119. 673 F.2d 425, 442 (1982).
120. Id.
121. CECA, 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-42 (1976).
123. Without a severability clause the court was forced to make a determination of
legislative intent without any express language in the statute.
124. AFGE, 697 F.2d 303 (1982); CECA, 673 F.2d 425 (1982).
125. AFGE, 697 F.2d 303 (1982); CECA, 673 F.2d 425 (1982). The courts stated
that the presence of a severability clause would not be conclusive evidence that a statute
should be served.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 202 (1976). The veto provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act was
determined to be severable from the rest of the statutes.
127. CECA, 673 F.2d at 442-43.
128. Id. at 2774.
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 330342 (1976).
130. 673 F.2d 425.
131. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
132. Id. 8 U.S.C. § 406 is the severability clause of the INA. It states that if one
section of the statute is declared invalid the rest of the statute should stand.
133. 8 U.S.C. § 406 (1976).
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Despite the presence of a severability clause, Justices Rehnquist and
White dissented on the grounds that Congress did not intend to
allow the veto provision 135 of the INA to be severed. 136 In his dis-
sent, Justice Rehnquist stated that "the excepting provision was in
the statute when it was enacted, and there can be no doubt that the
legislature intended that the meaning of the other provisions should
be taken as restricted accordingly." 137
The problems both the Chada and CECA courts faced in an at-
tempt to ascertain legislative intent, exemplify the possibility of in-
consistency which can result from the application of the legislative
intent test in determining the severability of a congressional veto
provision. Application of the legislative intent test could result in
the creation of a statute which Congress never intended to enact.138
Because of the possibility of misinterpretation, and the absence of a
clear indication of legislative intent, the court should be wary in
applying the legislative intent test to determine if a veto provision is
severable.
2) The second problem with the standard tests for severability
should not be applied to veto provisions is that a veto provision can
be considered as a proviso.1 39 As such, they should be an exception
to the general rules for severability.
A proviso is a clause engrafted on an enactment to restrain or
modify the enacting clause or to except from its operation some-
thing which otherwise would have been within it. It also acts to
exclude or prevent possible grounds of misinterpretation. It is
designed to prevent an interpretation which extends that statute to
cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its pur-
view.140 By its very nature a veto provision can be considered as a
proviso to the rest of the statute. The function of a veto provision is
to allow Congress to exercise post enactment control over the exec-
utive. 141 It allows them to prevent officials of the executive branch
from implementing a statute in a way which is inconsistent with the
intent of the legislature.142 By "vetoing" an act of the executive
branch, Congress could insure that any implementation of a statute
134. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2774-75.
135. 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2) (1976).
136. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2816 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2817, 2764 (emphasis added).
138. Sprargue v. Thompson, 11 U.S. 90, 95 (1886). Severing a portion of a statute
could result in changing that statute to such an extent that the resulting law does not
conform to what the legislature originally intended. The legislative intent is so difficult
to ascertain that any attempted analysis may give rise to misinterpretation.
139. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
140. United States v. Morrow, 226 U.S. 531 (1912); Minis v. United States, 40 U.S.
423 (1841).
141. See Javits, supra note 6, at 445.
142. Id. at 460.
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was consistent with the purview of that statute. 143 The Department
of Education Organization Act' 44 authorized the Secretary of Edu-
cation, an executive official, to prescribe rules and regulations as he
determines are necessary to administer and manage the functions of
the department. 145 The statute also contained a veto provision
which stated that rules and regulations promulgated under the Act
could be disapproved by a concurrent resolution of Congress.146 As
this example indicates, veto provisions act as provisos to the main
body of a statute by allowing Congress to retain control over the
implementation of the statute by the executive branch.
Since a veto provision can qualify as a proviso, the rule in Davis v.
Wallace 147 and Frost v. Corporation Commission 148 can be applied
to show that the legislative intent test is inadequate to determine if a
veto provision should be severed. In Davis and Frost, the Supreme
Court ruled that a proviso could not be severed if it was originally
written into the statute. 149 The Court reasoned that severing such a
provision would result in an extension of the scope of the statute.' 50
Such an extension would be contrary to the legislative intent of a
statute by including subject matter which the legislature expressly
chose to exclude.151 The Davis and Frost analysis can be applied to
the "congressional veto" because (1) the veto provision can be con-
sidered a proviso 152 and (2) severing a veto provision will expand
the scope of the statute contrary to legislative intent. 5 3 By severing
a veto provision the executive branch would be free to expand or
limit the scope of a statute through its implementation. Such an
expansion or limitation would constitute a defacto contradiction of
legislative intent by altering the purview of the statute.' 54 A veto
provision is a control mechanism.' 55 Its mere presence in a statute
indicates the legislature's desire to restrict the scope of that stat-
143. Id.
144. 2 U.S.C.S. § 3347 (1979).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 257 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1922).
148. 278 U.S. 515 (1929).
149. Id. at 525-26.
150. Id. at 525, 527. By removing a provision, especially a veto provision, a statute
may be altered to such an extent that its scope may be enlarged to include subject
matter not intended to be covered.
151. Id.
152. AFGE, 697 F.2d 303 (1982). In AFGE the court classified a veto provision as a
proviso. Since a veto provision can be labeled a proviso, the Frost analysis can be
applied.
153. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2716-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154. Frost, 278 U.S. 515 (1929).
155. The veto provision is used as a means to control the implementation of a stat-
ute. As a result it is referred to as a control mechanism. Smith & Struve, Aftershocks of
the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69 A.B.A.J. 1258 (1983).
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ute. 5 6 By removing it, the court would affect a fundamental
change in the nature of the statute, which was not accounted for
when the legislature enacted the law. 157 Because a veto provision is
a proviso, its excise from a statute would contradict legislative in-
tent. A test which uses legislative intent to determine if a veto pro-
vision is severable could only find that the provision is not
severable. Thus, when literally applied, the legislative intent test is
not adequate to determine if a veto provision should be severed
from its statutory framework.
3) A third problem with the legislative intent test is that it does
not address the issue of the constitutionality of the remaining provi-
sions of the statute.
Congress has used the congressional veto as a means to retain
control over authority it had broadly delegated to the executive
branch. 5 8 In the past forty years Congress has delegated enormous
amounts of legislative authority to the executive branch. 159 The
complexities of modern government have led Congress to legislate
by declaring broad policy goals and general standards, leaving pol-
icy options to the discretion of executive officers.' 60 Congress has
used the veto provision as a means to ensure its policies are imple-
mented in accordance with legislative intent.161 In the event that a
veto provision is severed, the issue whether what remains consti-
tutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power must be
addressed.
The general rule governing the delegation of legislative power to
the executive branch states that: the legislature may not, unless
otherwise expressed by the Constitution, delegate legislative func-
tions to the executive officers or bodies.162 Having established stan-
dards, or rules for their guidance it may leave to them matters of
administrative detail, including the making of regulations and the
determination of fact. Legislative functions include the making of
policy as well as the establishment of rules. 163
Beginning with Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States,16
156. Frost, 278 U.S. 525 (1929). The presence of a proviso in a statute is indicative
of the legislature's intent to restrict the scope of the statute. Since a veto provision can
be considered a proviso, its presence in a statute is evidence of the legislature's intent to
restrict the purview of that statute.
157. Id. By changing the statute, the court creates a different law. This new law
was not the result which the legislature intended. If a law is changed, the full intent of
the legislature could not be followed.
158. See Javits, supra note 6, at 463.
159. Id. at 459.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 461-62.
162. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1935).
163. Id.
164. 295 U.S. 495 (1934).
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a series of cases established and defined the rules which govern
what constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
In Schechter, the Court stated that Congress is not permitted to
abdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative functions with
which it was vested.165 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 166 stated that
Article I, Section 1167 of the Constitution vests all legislative powers
in the Congress. 68 The Court then ruled that Congress could not
abdicate or transfer to others essential legislative functions with
which it was vested. In 1980, the Supreme Court rulings in
Schechter and Panama were cited in Industrial Union v. American
Petroleum Institute.169 In Industrial Union, the Court ruled that a
statute would be unconstitutional if it made a broad and sweeping
delegation of legislative power.' 70
The above-mentioned cases established the parameters of what
would create an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
They set out the criteria by which a statute could be tested to see if
it in fact did create an unconstitutional delegation of power. If a
statute, absent its veto provision delegates power to the executive,
which is sweeping or essentially legislative in nature, that statute
would be unconstitutional.
The congressional veto has allowed Congress to delegate author-
ity without adopting rules or guidelines for the executive to follow,
while still allowing it to retain control over the implementation of
the statute. 171 As long as Congress maintains control over the ac-
tions of the executive branch concerning the promulgation of a stat-
ute, it can be argued that there is no sweeping delegation of power
or a delegation of an essential legislative function. Absent sufficient
congressional control over the implementation of a statute, any del-
egation of authority which gives the executive branch a free hand to
form policies and establish rules may be considered to be a sweeping
delegation of fundamental power, and thus unconstitutional. With-
out the "veto" provision as a control mechanism, Congress may be
delegating authority without the required rules or guidelines to
make such a delegation constitutional.172 There are other means
165. Id. at 529-30.
166. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
168. Id. "All legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
169. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
170. Id. at 646.
171. See Javits, supra note 6. See also Smith, supra note 2, at 1258-59.
172. Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1955); Schechter, 295 U.S. 495
(1934). If Congress cannot retain control over the executive's implementation of a stat-
ute through a veto provision, they would have to establish rules and guidelines sufficient
enough to allow a delegation of power to be constitutional. If a statute gives the execu-
tive branch too much leeway in implementing a law, then they could be considered to
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which Congress can employ to control executive action. Congress
could use supplemental legislation to restrict an executive interpre-
tation of a statute. 173 This, however, would be an ineffective
method of control. "Legislative power is slower to exercise than
executive power. There are inherent delays while the ponderous
machinery of committee hearings and debates is put into mo-
tion." 174 Since Congress would not be able to legislate fast enough,
the executive would be allowed to exercise authority which Con-
gress had no power to delegate to it. As a result, the statute which
conveyed such power to the executive branch would constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Had Congress retained the power to "veto" executive actions,
Schechter and Panama may have been decided differently.1 75 Ab-
sent a veto provision many statutes which had employed the device,
when subjected to the tests applied in Schechter and Panama, may
be found unconstitutional.
For the three reasons outlined above the tests applied to deter-
mine the severability of a veto provision are inadequate. Legislative
intent is hard to determine and can often be misinterpreted. In ad-
dition, a congressional veto provision by its nature is a proviso and,
as such, was intended by Congress to limit the scope of statutes. Its
removal from a statute would result in a change of its purview and,
as such, contradict the intent of the legislature. Finally, the legisla-
tive intent test does not take into account whether the remainder of
a statute absent its veto provision would be an unconstitutional del-
egation of power to the executive since it would delegate authority
without allowing the Congress to retain control.1 76
The following is a proposal for an alternative test which would be
more appropriate to determine if a veto provision is severable. It
would be able to account for the shortcomings of the legislative in-
have assumed functions which are legislative in nature. The presence of rules and
guidelines prevents the transfer of legislative power to the executive branch by restrict-
ing their freedom of implementation. It also assures that the intent of Congress is
followed.
173. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2785 (1983). The Court is considering whether the
veto provision violated the presentment clause stating that Congress could control exec-
utive action by passing legislation instead of using the veto provision. They noticed that
the Congress could pass additional legislation to prevent or change actions of the execu-
tive which did not conform to the legislative intent.
174. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952). The
court here commented on the inefficiency of the legislative process.
175. See Javits, supra note 6. The Court in Schechter and Panama could have
reached different results if the statutes those cases dealt with had contained a veto pro-
vision. Applying a reverse analysis it could be argued that a statute absent the veto
provision could be considered unconstitutional if it failed to pass the tests established by
Schechter and Panama.
176, See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
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tent test, and provide a more stable and practical guideline for
courts.
V. PROPOSED TEST
The following is a two part test to determine if a veto provision
should be severed from its statutory framework. The first part of
the test determines whether a statute, absent its veto provision, con-
tains sufficient guidelines to insure that it would not create an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch. This could be accomplished by applying the analysis 177 set
forth in Schechter and Panama to the remaining portions of a stat-
ute after a veto provision has been severed. In Schechter and Pan-
ama the Court was able to look at the statutes directly to determine
whether there were sufficient guidelines present to allow Congress
to delegate authority.178 If the guidelines in the statute were exten-
sive enough to limit the discretion of the executive and allow Con-
gress to control the policy and intent of the statute, it would be
constitutional. 79 A veto provision is an obvious means of overt
control, its only function is to insure that the legislature can main-
tain control over the promulgation of the statute. 18 0 There may,
however, be other guidelines and safeguards present which would
be sufficient enough to insure that any delegation of authority by
the statute is constitutional.
In Chada, part of the test used by the Court to determine sever-
ability inquired into whether the remaining portion of the statute
would be fully operative as law.""1 However, when the Court ap-
plied that part of the test, they did not inquire into whether the
remainder of the statute would be constitutional. Instead, it cen-
tered its analysis on whether the remainder of the statute was a
workable administrative mechanism without the veto provision. 182
177. This refers to the tests applied by those courts to decide what is unconstitu-
tional in delegation of legislative power.
178. Schechter, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1934). The Court in these cases looked at the
statutes with which they were confronted and decided if there were sufficient guidelines
present to warrant the delegation of power by the statute. The benefit of this is that it
created an objective test which the courts could apply.
179. Id. at 537. The Court stated that if there are sufficient guidelines in a statute to
prevent the executive from acquiring unfettered control, the statutes could make a con-
stitutional delegation of legislative power.
180. See Javits, supra note 6.
181. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (1983).
182. Id. at 2776. When the Court discussed the part of the test for severability
which stated that the statute would have to be fully operative as law absent the veto
provision, they did not deal with the issue of constitutionality. The Court's analysis
centered around whether the procedures involved would be a practical method for the
administration of the statute. The Court noted that since the Attorney General would
still have to report to Congress on the suspension of the deportation of an alien, con-
gressional oversight would be preserved. This analysis, however, assumes that Congress
1984)
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The question whether the statute absent the veto provision was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power was not addressed.
The application of this part of the test would protect the interests
of Congress by restoring to them power and authority they could
not surrender or abdicate to the executive. It would also insure that
the requirements of Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution are fol-
lowed. 183 If the statute does contain sufficient guidelines and re-
strictions to control its implementation absent the veto provision,
the veto provision should be severable. If the statute did not con-
tain such guidelines, the entire statute would have to fail.
If applied, this part of the test would compensate for the short-
comings184 of the legislative intent test. It would provide the courts
with a more lucid and practical test which could be applied with
some consistency. If the analysis presented here is applied to the
determination whether to sever a veto provision, a more uniform
approach would be created for the courts to apply.
The second part of the test should inquire into whether there is
another reasonable method available to Congress to control the ex-
ecutive's use of the power and authority which Congress delegated
to them, absent a veto provision. Since a congressional veto provi-
sion is in essence a control mechanism, 18 5 its removal would create
a power vacuum which would be filled de facto by the executive.' 86
If the veto provision is to be severed, Congress should be allowed to
retain the control it provided for in the statute. The availability of
an alternative control measure is essential to allow Congress to ex-
ercise its full legislative function.1 87
One example of such an alternative would be what has been
called the laying procedure. 188 This procedure requires that before
regulations take effect they must be submitted to Congress to lay on
the table for a specified period of time during which Congress may
is able to effectively enforce its intent. The Court failed to present an analysis as to
whether the result of severing the veto provision would be an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative power.
183. See supra notes 164 and 166.
184. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
185. Frost, 278 U.S. 525, 526 (1929). A veto provision is a control mechanism, and
as such can be considered to be a proviso.
186. If a provision of a statute which limits the discretion of the executive is re-
moved, the executive would be able to expand its control over the implementation of
that statute and as such assume power that Congress never intended it should have.
187. See Javits, supra note 6, at 463. Although Congress cannot abdicate its power,
it must be allowed to exercise its authority to its fullest extent. By delegating some
authority, Congress is able to increase legislative efficiency and effectiveness.
188. For a discussion on the laying procedure see Boisvert, .4 Legislative Tool for the
Supervision of Administrative Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REV., 683
(1956) and Sibbach v. Wilson and Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1941).
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reject the proposals only by formal legislative enactment. 189 This
procedure primarily serves as an information device, which gives
Congress time to correct gross violations of congressional intent. 190
It would seem that Congress is in a better position to find alterna-
tive means of control. If there is no reasonable alternative means
for Congress to maintain control over the implementation of a stat-
ute the veto provision should not be severed.' 91 In such a case the
statute would no longer be a workable administrative mechanism
since the control exercised by Congress would no longer be present.
The two part test proposed above would provide the courts with
a practical guideline to determine if a veto provision is severable, as
well as insure that Congress is able to retain adequate control over
the authority it delegates.
CONCLUSION
For fifty-one years Congress used the congressional veto as a
means to hold executive agencies accountable.192 In the aftermath
of the Chada decision, the courts will be faced with deciding if the
veto provisions in over two hundred statutes can be severed.
This Comment has shown that the courts in Chada, CECA and
AFGE adopted the general tests193 for severability to determine
whether the veto provision those cases dealt with were severable.
Those tests were asserted to be inadequate to properly decide the
issue of severability because (1) systematic determination of legisla-
tive intent is impossible when dealing with a legislative veto; 194 (2) a
congressional veto provision can be considered a proviso and as
such will not lend itself to the application of the legislative intent
test; 95 and (3) absent a veto provision, a statute may be void as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive
189. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1941). The laying system would
allow executive rules and actions to be presented to Congress and laid on the table for a
period of time. If Congress opposed such action, they would then be able to pass legisla-
tion to stop it.
190. See Javits, supra note 6, at 463. It is more efficient in cases of gross error since
the passing of corrective legislation would take a great deal of time and effort. As a
result, this method may not be applied if the acts of the executive which are disapproved
of are not considered to be gross enough to warrant such extensive action.
191. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (1983). This argument is derived from the Chada
Court's emphasis on the statute absent its veto provision being a workable administra-
tive mechanism. If Congress has no other reasonable means available to it to control
the actions of the executive, then the statute should not be considered a workable ad-
ministrative mechanism.
192. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The use of the veto provision has
steadily increased since its inception in 1932.
193. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
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branch. The standard test does not address itself to this
consideration. 19 6
The two part test proposed 197 would account for the shortcom-
ings of the test currently applied by the courts. 198 It would inquire
into two issues. First, it would look to the statute, absent its veto
provision to see if it creates an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power. 99 Second, it would look to see if there was another
available method of control which Congress could employ to ensure
that the scope of a statute is not expanded.2°° This two part test
would provide a clear and systematic rule which can be used to
determine if a veto provision is severable.
As statutes containing the veto provisions are challenged, the
courts will have to deal with a new set of facts and circumstances in
their analysis of a severability provision. A practical and uniform
rule would aid the courts in deciding on the severability of veto
provisions. Without such a rule, Congress would be without gui-
dance on how to proceed with remedial and future legislation.
Angelo G. Garubo*
196. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 177-91 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 66-108 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 172-91 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
* This publication is dedicated to Mr. & Mrs. Philip Garubo, who have shown
me that all things are possible.
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